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Abstract
Variousstrandsofresearchineducational,socialandorganizationalpsychologyfocusonstructuresofcollectivelycreatedmeaning
that emerge in and coordinate activities of groups. Despite expanding, this ﬁeld still lacks conceptual clarity, enhanced by the multi-
tude of terms used, such as common ground, shared understanding, collective mind, team mental models, and distributed cognition.
We conducted a review of the conceptual frameworks being used in empirical studies, focusing on the premises of the conceptu-
alizations. Therefore, we connected these conceptualizations to either cognitive or socio-cultural perspectives on the social nature
of cognition. Some studies are identiﬁed as representing initial ways of boundary crossing between these perspectives. To conclude,
we explore ways for boundary crossing and cross-fertilization in future research.
© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There is a growing attention for collaboration between people. Group work has become a cornerstone of organiza-
tional life and it is increasingly being capitalized on in educational settings. Organizations rely on teams to deal with
the increasingly high-demands of the environment. This is most obvious in the multi-disciplinary/-functional teams
that are brought into action to deal with complex problems (Derry, DuRussel, & O’Donnel, 1998; Hall, Stevens, &
Torralba, 2002). Fundamentally, both the working teams in organizations as the learning groups in schools are con-
fronted with the same issues; “they are faced with challenges of establishing common frames of reference, resolving
discrepancies in understanding, negotiating issues of individual and collective action, and coming to joint understand-
ing” (Barron, 2000, pp. 403–404). Collaboration is hereby a process of building and maintaining a shared conception
of a problem (Dillenbourg, Traum, & Schneider, 1996; Roschelle, 1992). Concomitantly, studying groups and group
collaborationhasbecomeanimportantareaofresearch(Cohen&Bailey,1997).Bothineducationalandpsychological
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literature there is an identiﬁcation of the need to study group learning as truly collaborative (Crook, 1998). Researchers
became convinced that an individual approach will not fully grasp the phenomenon of group-work and group-learning
(Thompson & Fine, 1999). Several cognitive constructs, such as mental models, which have traditionally been consid-
ered at the individual-level of analysis, now become recognized as group-level phenomena (Klimoski & Mohammed,
1994). In trying to grasp and understand this collaborative effort, new research interests focus on the ways groups are
creating meaning and are acting upon collectively developed cognition (Thompson, 1998).
The growing interest in this group cognition can be recognized by a multitude of terms that can be found in the
literature, such as common ground, team mental models, shared understanding, distributed cognition and collective
mind.Thesetermsalldoreferinsomewaytostructuresofcollectivemeaningthatemergeinandcoordinatetheactivities
of a group. The idea of group cognition is proposed as a central issue in understanding (effective) group work. Group
cognition is argued to provide a basis for the coordination of individual actions as well as for future communication
and activity of the group (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Hutchins, 1995). In the learning sciences it is pointed out that the
development of group cognition is related to the learning potential of groups (Roschelle, 1992; Webb & Palincsar,
1996); practices of meaning-making in the context of joint activity are at the heart of collaborative learning (Suthers,
2005; Stahl, Koschmann, & Suthers, 2006). The development of group cognition is a process of negotiating and
interrelating diverse views of group members. This process enables group members to learn from others’ preferences
and viewpoints by facing different viewpoints and by accepting the existence of them as legitimate (Engestr¨ om,
Engestr¨ om,&K¨ arkk¨ ainen,1995).Moreover,thisprocessisarguedtoleadtorichargumentationsandcreativeproblem
solutions (Homan, 2001; Matusov, 1996), as well as to the members experiencing ownership of the activity and of
group products (Fiol, 1994; Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001). The recognition of these merits made it a worthwhile
endeavor for many researchers to study the processes in and through which group cognition is actually developing,
potentially leading to new ways of improving group practice and group learning (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001b).
Although the research on group cognition attracts a great deal of interest and is considered to be valuable, it
is confronted with some difﬁculties (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001b; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993;
Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Matusov, 1996). In the past, some articles were published which tried to combine
the conceptual developments and empirical results in ﬁelds that are concerned with the idea of group cognition
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Thompson & Fine, 1999). These reviews acknowledge
theusefulnessandpotentialoftheconstruct,andrecognizethatthisisapromisinglineofresearch,butatthesametime
they also stress the need for more fundamental theoretical work before this potential can be realized. More speciﬁcally,
they urge for theoretical integration:
(...) we have established that despite the popularity of the concept, many authors have been very casual in
its application. Most disconcerting, many writers do not really deﬁne what they mean by a shared or team
mental model. There is a surprising lack of deﬁnitional or conceptual clarity. Also problematic, when attempts at
deﬁnition have been made, different authors have deﬁned things in alternative (usually in incomplete) ways. In
our view, part of the problem is that writers in a particular area often do not cite the literature in other areas that
may be referring to the same concept of interest (albeit with a different name). To put it another way, heretofore
there has not been much “cross-fertilization”. Various writers seem to be “re-inventing the wheel” (Klimoski &
Mohammed, 1994, pp. 426–427)
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001b) have tried to describe the issues and problems the ﬁeld is confronted with, and
the issues on which conceptual clarity is lacking. Primarily, the literature is neither consistent in labeling nor deﬁning
conceptsofgroupcognition.Therefore,itbecomesunclearwhatisreferredtobygroupcognition.Wealreadynotedthat
different authors use multiple terms to indicate group cognition. There are also substantial differences in the meaning
of the concept. This can be illustrated by comparing the following three studies. Carley (1997) examined the “team
mental model” by looking at the similarity of declarative and procedural knowledge about the task. A different study
is that of Levesque, Wilson, and Wholey (2001), who examined under the label “shared mental model” the similarity
of cognition about the team processes and expertise in the team. Yet another study of Yoo and Kanawattanachai (2001)
focusedonthe‘collectivemind’ofgroups,herebyreferringtothesocialcognitivesysteminwhichindividualsheedfully
interrelate their actions. Besides the use of different terms and meanings, sometimes the same terms are used with
differentmeanings.Forexample,Matusov(1996)arguesthattraditionally“intersubjectivity”isstudiedwithafocuson
processes of uniﬁcation of the participants’ subjectivities, while he pleads for a focus on how participants coordinate
their contributions in the joint activity. A different deﬁnition of intersubjectivity lies behind these various approaches.S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 41
Cannon-BowersandSalas(2001b)warnthatclearstatementsofwhatgroupcognitionisandhowitoperatesbecome
impossibleaslongasthereisconceptualconfusion.Oneoftheproblemsemergingfromthisistheusageofverydistinct
measurement approaches in different studies. For example, whereas Levesque et al. (2001) and Carley (1997) measure
mental models of individuals and try to compute some kind of similarity as indicator for group cognition, Yoo and
Kanawattanachai (2001) ask the team to evaluate the interrelations of the actions in the team as a whole and use this
as an indicator.
The lack of clarity encountered in this area of research, makes it difﬁcult to make use of and build forward on the
various empirical studies, since it is unclear how the empirical studies relate to each other as they use many different
conceptsaswellasdifferent,butoftenimplicit,understandingsofgroupcognition.Boththeresearchongroupcognition
and the practice of groups and group learning, or the optimization of this practice, would beneﬁt from an awareness of
the different conceptualizations being used. This would encourage future research to build upon previous results and
coulddeliverguidelinesforbothconceptualizingtheobjectofstudyandchoosingresearchmethodologies.Itopensthe
possibility to compare the evidence gathered, potentially leading to more general conclusions, and building a ground
for new questions and approaches.
The purpose of this review is to analyze the different conceptualizations of the construct group cognition by looking
at the premises of the various conceptualizations. Instead of making a comparative inventory of concepts related to
the construct of group cognition and their deﬁnitions, we aim to go beyond these concepts and deﬁnitions by pointing
out differences and similarities in how the construct of group cognition is conceptualized in the empirical literature
in educational and psychological sciences. By typifying the various conceptualizations we aim to lay the ground
for conceptual clarity that enables to build on each other’s work. This conceptual review is not intended to provide a
completeandﬁnaloverviewofempiricalstudiesongroupcognitionnorpresentthespeciﬁcﬁndings.Rather,thereview
ismeanttocoverandstructurethebroadrangeofconceptualizations.Theemphasisisonadialecticre-conceptualization
of the existing diverse terminology, and the identiﬁcation of the conﬂicting premises and methodologies.
We will present a framework that we found to reveal the important dimensions on which these conceptualizations
differ from each other. This framework draws on two socio-genetic views, representing two different ideas about the
social nature of cognition. How one understands the social nature of cognition is fundamental for conceptualizing
group cognition. Therefore, this framework was found to be of value to map the types of conceptualizations of group
cognition that are found in the empirical literature.
The plan for this review is as follows. In the next section, we will ﬁrst elaborate on the framework in which we
distinguish cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives. This will be followed by a method-section in which we describe
howweusedthisframeworktoanalyzethedifferencesinconceptualizationsthatarepresentintheempiricalliterature.
Next, we will present the results of this analysis. We found that the studies on group cognition can be categorized
into three types of conceptualizations of group cognition. Hence, in the results section these three groups of studies
are discussed, respectively illustrating understandings of group cognition according to cognitive perspectives, socio-
cultural perspectives, and those that seem to be on the boundary between these perspectives. We will characterize each
group of studies by showing how group cognition is being addressed, both conceptually and operationally. We will end
up by looking at the value of these different types of conceptualizations and questioning how they complement each
other. Finally, we will explore how to reach more cross-fertilization in future research.
2. Two socio-genetic views: cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives
In our process of analyzing the literature on group cognition, we noticed an essential difference in the concep-
tualizations that relates to a more fundamental distinction in the way one perceives the social nature of cognition.
To address the question of how to frame the diversity of conceptualizations of group cognition, this article draws on
Valsiner and Van der Veer (2000), who clearly identiﬁed and distinguished two socio-genetic views, one underly-
ing cognitive and one underlying socio-cultural perspectives which entail basically different ideas about the social
nature of cognition. In order to further analyze the conceptualizations of group cognition and explicate the dif-
ferences, we used these socio-genetic views as initial framework for the analysis. Before turning to the actual
analysis, we will elaborate on these views and build the framework we used for our interpretations. In building
our framework, we integrated literature in general educational and psychological theorizing that closely relates to the
socio-geneticviewspresentedbyValsinerandVanderVeer,andthatpointstothecontroversybetweenthesocio-genetic
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In educational and psychological theorizing an individualistic approach towards the human mind was, and perhaps
stillis,dominant.Thisapproachhasbeenquestionedforitslackofprovidingameaningfulaccountofsocialinteractions
(Thompson, 1998). At present, most social scientists seem to acknowledge that human psychological functions stand
in close relationship with the social environment in which they are situated (Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000). As
such, individual learning and development is studied as involving social aspects (Salomon & Perkins, 1998). Through
acknowledging the importance of the social practices in which the individual is engaged, the dispute is no longer
about the appropriateness of the individual versus the social collective as unit of analysis (Cobb & Bowers, 1999).
Rather, there is confusion about how the actual relation between the person and the social should be conceptualized.
Valsiner and Van der Veer distinguished two socio-genetic views that theorize this relation differently. They state
“there is the axiomatic preference for fusion (of person and the social environment) or inclusive separation (i.e., the
person is viewed as distinguished from the environment, yet interdependent with it) bases for socio-genetic models”
(p. 6). Whereas the former socio-genetic view perceives the person and the social environment as one whole and
relies on terms like participation and adaptation, the latter socio-genetic view perceives the person and the social
environment as separate units that are related to each other and uses terms such as internalization and externalization.
Sfard (1998) notes a similar distinction of perspectives when she describes two different learning metaphors. The ﬁrst,
more traditional metaphor being used is the acquisition metaphor, wherein learning is seen as acquiring knowledge.
The subject of learning is the individual who acquires knowledge about the world surrounding him/her. A learning
theory that is based on this metaphor is cognitivism. The second metaphor is the participation metaphor, wherein
learning is seen as a process of becoming participant in a community. The learner is then also seen as a participant,
and knowledge is rather an aspect of discourse and activity. Knowledge is preferably referred to as “knowing”. This
metaphor is said to be related to socio-cultural views of learning. Socio-cultural views emphasize the social, cultural,
historical and situative nature of cognition and activity, and are grounded in traditions of Vygotsky (1978), Mead
(1934), Bakhtin (1981, 1986), Luria (1976) and Leontev (1978). Salomon and Perkins (1998) noted that the different
ways of understanding social contributions to learning are the result from different ideas about where information
processes lie (within the individual mind versus within social interaction) and about what entity these processes serve
(the individual or a social entity). It is the ﬁrst dimension, where information processes lie, that distinguishes the
two socio-genetic views. Combining these distinctions, the one view on socio-genesis is the “inclusive separation”
view, which is related to the “acquisition metaphor” and connected to “learning within the mind”. The other view on
socio-genesis is the “fusion” view, which is related to the “participation metaphor” and connected to “learning within
social interaction”.
These two socio-genetic views also lay behind a previous discussion between researchers from the cognitive per-
spective and those from the situated perspectives as found in psychological theories (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996,
1997; Cobb & Bowers, 1999; Greeno, 1997). Also, several attempts have been made to create initial bridges between
the two perspectives (Billet, 1996; Gauvain, 2004; Glick, 2004; Greeno, 1998; Saxe & Simonde, 2004). In order to
arrive at a framework for our review, we have scrutinized how the various authors characterized and positioned the
socio-genetic views, and determined what distinctive conceptual dimensions are associated with them. The results are
summarized in Table 1.
In this article, we have chosen to use the general term “cognitive perspectives” which is associated to the inclusive
separation view of socio-genesis and in a general sense the term “socio-cultural perspectives” to refer to the fusion
view of socio-genesis.
As pointed out in Table 1, an essential difference between the two socio-genetic views is encapsulated in the
understanding of the individual. In the one view, underlying cognitive perspectives, the individual is seen as an
autonomous agent, an active person who constructs personal understanding of the world surrounding him or her.
This understanding is reﬂected in a mental network of internal constructs of meaning stored in memory. The social
world surrounding the individual is seen as a set of social contexts in which the person acts. These contexts are
considered important and although complex, can be analyzed through its components. The individual moves through
these contexts, responds to them and is affected by them. These notions indicate that the social is certainly not denied
by these perspectives, but that the social is understood through its residence in the mind of the individual.
Inthefusionviewofsocio-genesis,underlyingthesocio-culturalperspectives,theindividualisseenasaparticipantin
socialpractices,inwhichhe/sheisinteractingwithothersandwithmaterialandrepresentationalsystems.Participating
in social and cultural practices contributes to the construction of the participants’ dispositions to agree with certain
propositions or routine practices, and as such to his or her identity. The socio-cultural perspectives do not deny theS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 43
Table 1
Socio-genetic views: Cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives
Distinctive conceptual dimensions Cognitive perspectives Socio-cultural perspectives
“Inclusive separation” socio-genesis (Valsiner &
Van der Veer, 2000)
“Fusion” socio-genesis (Valsiner & Van der Veer,
2000)
The individual Individual as autonomous; promotes individuality Individual as participant; absorbs the individual in
social practices
The social world Contexts of performance Evolving systems of socially organized discourse
and activity
Individual-social Individual actions can be independent of social
structures or interactions
All individual activity involves socially organized
activity
Cognition Individually constructed structures in memory
consisting of conceptual and procedural knowledge
Dispositions to agree with certain propositions being
culturally shaped and patterned by social and
cultural circumstances
Learner (Re-)constructor Peripheral participant, apprentice
Learning Entails gaining possession over some commodity Entails contribution to an individual’s identity as
valuable participant in social practices
Knowledge is considered a structure in the person’s mind, and as
such a property, possession, or commodity of the
individual
is considered as knowing, and as such an aspect of
discourse and activity
Key terms knowledge, concepts, notions, meaning, sense,
schema, representation, reception, acquisition,
construction, internalisation, transmission
knowing, practice, activity, discourse,
communication, social mediation, participation,
belonging, situatedness, contextuality, cultural
embeddedness
existenceofanindividuals’mind,noritsagency,buttheyunderstandthismindassituatedintheparticipationprocesses
in systems of socially organized activity that are themselves evolving.
Research on group cognition can be identiﬁed that seems to be starting from either a cognitive or a socio-cultural
perspective. However, although representing two fundamentally different socio-genetic views, this is rarely made
explicit. As these socio-genetic views both convey a speciﬁc understanding of the social nature of cognition, they both
can be considered relevant for conceptualizing group cognition. To understand the concept of group cognition, one has
to deal with what is meant by cognition as well as what is meant by cognition at a group-level. This entails deﬁning
cognition (where does it reside?) and deﬁning cognition in terms of individual and social dimensions (how are they
related?).Forthatreason,wewillusetheframeworkpresentedinTable1tooutlinetheimportantdimensionsonwhich
the conceptualizations of group cognition in empirical studies differ. Hereby, we reach beyond the deﬁnition given by
authors and try to disclose their premises regarding socio-genetic views.
3. Method
3.1. Literature search
The goal of the literature search was to gather a representative sample of the multiplicity of conceptualizations
of group cognition. Hereto, the search was based on a variety of terms that refer to group cognition. Based on the
conceptualizations in theoretical literature (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001b; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and
our ﬁrst readings of empirical studies, we composed a list of synonyms, looking initially at all combinations of:
o Words implying cognition: capital, cognition, frame of reference, framework, ground, intersubjectivity, meaning,
mental model, mind, perspective, position, representation, thinking, understanding, view, vision, voice;
o Words referring to the aspect of group: collective, common, distributed, group, joint, mutual, shared, social, team.
Inthesearch,thesetermswerealwayscombinedwiththesearchterms“group”or“team”.2 Twomajorcomputerized
databases were screened: The Educational Resources Information Centre (ERIC) catalogue and PsycLIT. These
2 Some combinations already included the term group or team, for example ‘group cognition’ or ‘team mental models’. In the other combinations
it was necessary to limit the search to those studies that were looking at group level.44 S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63
databases give access to materials from the educational and psychological sciences, but also from related disciplines
such as organizational behavior, medicine, social work, law and criminology. We did not limit the search in time, nor
in source of publication.
A ﬁrst selection of the studies was based on the abstracts; in a next step also the complete articles were screened.
Those studies were selected which had group cognition as a central object of study (we were not interested in studies
that only marginally touched upon the idea) and they had to study this idea at the group-level (some studies con-
sider this idea at for example organizational level). Furthermore, we were primarily interested in empirical studies on
group cognition (a lot of studies mention group cognition terms but do not study it as such). The reason for focus-
ing on empirical studies was that we wanted to reach an in-depth understanding of how the author conceptualized
the idea of group cognition. Therefore, we did not only focus on the explicit meaning attributed to the concept of
group cognition by the author as shown in the theoretical background and deﬁnitions of the concept, but also on
the meaning-as-used by the author. The latter is best shown in the research methodology being used to measure the
concept in the empirical part of the studies. Although non-empirical work was taken into account for the develop-
ment of the theoretical framework, this work was not included in the analysis. This resulted in 22 studies.3 These
22 studies formed the basis for further analysis. Though this is a small amount of studies, on the basis of system-
atically scrutinizing the literature we believe they cover and demonstrate the diverse conceptualizations of group
cognition.
3.2. Analyzing the literature
We summarized the studies we selected based on a range of characteristics (study aim, theoretical assump-
tions, concept used for and deﬁnition of group cognition, study design, group characteristics, task of the group,
time, method of analysis, measurement of group cognition, antecedents and consequences of group cognition and
the subsequent analysis, conclusions of the study). This resulted in a table of review used as a tool for further
analysis.
Our analysis aimed to question in what respects these conceptualizations differ, using the socio-genetic views
as framework. First, studies were categorized as representing a cognitive or a socio-cultural view on group cog-
nition. This categorization was a result of the conceptual dimensions in Table 1, and determined holistically
whether the theoretical framework of the study represented more the cognitive or the socio-cultural perspec-
tives. The ﬁrst two authors of this paper were concerned with categorizing the studies. In most cases, both
authors came to the same categorization. The few cases of doubt were resolved after discussion. This resulted
in 11 studies representing cognitive perspectives, 5 studies representing socio-cultural perspectives, and 4 stud-
ies having characteristics of both socio-genetic perspectives. These latter studies were classiﬁed as “boundary
crossing studies”. Two studies (Hare & O’Neill, 2000; Mulder, Swaak, & Kessels, 2002) were found that did
not deﬁne or conceptualize, nor offered more implicit understandings of the concept in the theoretical introduc-
tion. They did not analyze group cognition itself, but group member’s perception of the development of group
cognition. Because no conceptualizations could be derived from these studies, they were excluded from further
analysis.
After categorizing the studies, we analyzed them and focused on the socio-genetic issues “where cognition resides”
(how is cognition conceptualized), and “how the individual and the social relate” (how is cognition conceptualized at
group-level). We will discuss how the different studies in the discerned groups of cognitive perspectives, socio-cultural
perspectives and boundary crossing studies dealt with these two questions. In addition to this categorized description,
the Appendix A provides an overview of each individual study (i.e., the conceptualization and analysis of the group
cognition-construct).
3 Of the 984 abstracts that we found with the search, 167 studies were selected which referred to group cognition terms as one of the central
concepts in the study. Of those, 120 abstracts studied cognition at group level. Only 70 abstracts referred to an empirical study. Of those, we were
able to ﬁnd 29 studies (As we did not limit the search to time or source, several studies were not traceable despite contacting the authors. These
non-traceable studies concerned 7 conference papers and 15 dissertations. Additionally, 2 publications appeared to be non-English literature and
were not included. Also, 1 book, 4 chapters in a book, 9 articles and 3 manuscripts published by an organisation were non-retraceable, some of them
because they were published more then 15 years ago.), of which 22 studies indeed concerned empirical studies with group cognition as object of
study.S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 45





perspectives, socio-cultural perspectives and those that reﬂect both perspectives (the boundary crossing studies).
4.1.1. Cognitive perspectives
Asfortheconceptualizationofcognition,thestudiesconnectedtothecognitiveperspectivesrefertotheknowledgeof
the individual team members. More speciﬁcally, these studies rely mostly on the construct of mental models (Klimoski
& Mohammed, 1994). This construct assumes that individual people organize knowledge into structured, meaningful
patterns and store them in their memory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rouse & Morris, 1986). Some of the authors (Druskat
& Pescosolido, 2002; Edelson, 2000; Levesque et al., 2001; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers,
2000; Peterson, Mitchell, Thompson, & Burr, 2000) point out how these mental model function, hereby showing the
crucial importance of this construct for understanding (team) performance. Reference is often made to the deﬁnition
offered by Rouse and Morris (1986): “mechanisms whereby humans generate descriptions of system purpose and
form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states” (p.
360). Mental models enable team members to form accurate explanations of and expectations for their environment
(Levesque et al., 2001), and in turn allow them to coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the
environment (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).
There are several types of mental models, containing different kinds of content. Each of these different types of
modelsisconsideredtoberelevantforthefunctioningofteams(Cannon-Bowersetal.,1993;Klimoski&Mohammed,
1994; Mathieu et al., 2000; Rentsch & Hall, 1994). The most elaborated categorization of the types of mental models
and their knowledge content is proposed by Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993). They discern four types of mental models
that can be shared in teams:
o Task model (e.g., group cognition regarding task strategies, environmental constraints);
o Team interaction model (e.g., group cognition regarding interactions patterns, roles/responsibilities);
o Team model (e.g., group cognition in terms of awareness of team-mates’ knowledge, skills);
o Equipmentmodel(e.g.,groupcognitionregardingasharedideaaboutequipmentfunctioning,operatingprocedures).
As indicated in Table 2, the studies reviewed primarily focus on task and/or team interaction as the type of mental
model. Only Levesque et al. (2001) did also study the mental models of team members about each other’s expertise
(team model). None of the studies considered the equipment model.
The analysis of the studies from a methodological perspective indicates that two different aspects of the mental
models as a knowledge structure are considered: (1) the content aspect or the possession of certain knowledge, and
(2) the structural aspects or the speciﬁc way the knowledge base is structured. Therefore, in trying to understand the
individual mental model, the literature (e.g., Langan-Fox, Code, & Langﬁeld-Smith, 2000; Mohammed & Dumville,
2001) claims that two issues need to be taken into consideration. One is elicitation; a procedure used to ascertain the
content of the mental model. The other issue is representation; a procedure used to determine the relation between the
content elements or the structure of the mental model.
A part of the analyzed studies (see Table 2) elicit the mental model content using Likert-scale questionnaires
(Edelson, 2000; Ensley & Pearce, 2001; Levesque et al., 2001; Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001; Peterson et al., 2000).
Hereby,thesestudiesdidnotlookattherepresentationorstructureofthementalmodels.Theotherstudieslookatboth
elicitationaswellasrepresentationofthementalmodels,usingthreedifferentkindsoftechniques.Onetechniquebeing
used is relatedness ratings (Marks, Burke, Sabella, & Zaccaro, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2000; Langan-Fox, Wirth, Code,
Langﬁeld-Smith,&Wirth,2001;Stout,Cannon-Bowers,Salas,&Milanovich,1999).Inthistechniqueindividualteam
members are asked to judge the relatedness of concepts provided by the researcher. This information is then used by
most authors (except for Langan-Fox et al., 2001) as input for the analysis, using programs as Pathﬁnder and UCINET.
























































Characteristics of the studies in cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives, and studies that cross the boundary
Cognition interpretation Measurement Group cognition
interpretation
Measurement Role of group cognition in
relation to group processes &
outcomes
Cognitive perspective -Individual task mental
model (4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 18,19,
20)
Quantitative analysis: Similarity/overlap between
individual mental models (3,
4, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21)
-Aggregation measurement
(3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 21)
-Input (6, 19, 20)
-Individual team interaction
mental model (3, 4, 6, 8, 13,
21)
-Relatedness ratings (6, 13,
19, 20)
-Global measurement (18) -Process (3, 8, 9, 14, 21)
-Likert-scale questionnaires
(3, 4, 8, 9, 21)
-Output (4, 13, 18)
-Concept mapping (19)
-cognitive mapping (14)
-discourse and activity (18)
Socio-cultural perspective -Process of deﬁning the
object of activity (task model)
(5, 11, 16, 17, 22)
Qualitative analysis: Cognition constituted by the
group within social
interaction (5, 11, 16, 17, 22)
Global measurement (5, 11,
16, 17, 22)
-Common ground (5, 17)
-Process of deﬁning the roles
and responsibilities (team
interaction model) (22)




-Group reports (11) -Updated common ground
(5)
Boundary crossing Task model (1, 2, 7) -Qualitative analysis of group
discourse and activity (2, 7)
Distributed (1, 2, 7) Global measurement (1, 2, 7) -Input (1, 7)
-Quantitative analysis of
self-assessment (1)
-Process (1, 2, 7)
Note: numbers refer to the numbers of the studies presented in Appendix A.S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 47
morecloselylinkedwithinthestructure(Kraiger,Salas,&Cannon-Bowers,1993).Asecondtechniqueusedisconcept
mapping (Marks et al., 2002), in which participants are asked to choose from a range of concepts and place them in
a pre-speciﬁed hierarchical structure. A third technique, used in one of the studies (Carley, 1997), is that of using
idiosyncraticinformationoftheteammembers.Inthisparticularstudytheparticipantsrespondedessayquestions.The
resultant texts are supposed to contain a portion of the author’s mental model at the time the text was created (Kaufer
& Carley, 1993). An automated approach of the cognitive mapping technique was used to extract the concepts and the
relations between these concepts out of these texts. This resulted in a map, a network of concepts that was considered
as an elicitation and representation of the individual’s mental models (Carley, 1997). The difﬁculty of the ﬁrst two
techniques is that the concepts relevant to the team or task are speciﬁed in advance by the researcher (based on other
sourcessuchastaskanalysis,experts,existingscales,etc.),whichmaynotmatchtheparticipants’knowledgestructures
(Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000). This drawback can be countered by the third technique of capturing the
idiosyncratic content of an individual’s knowledge structure. However, in this latter technique it can be difﬁcult to
compare different individual mental models (Mohammed et al., 2000).
Unlike the other studies, O’Neill, Johnson, and Johnson (1999) did not rely on a direct measurement of the “internal
private model”, but state that “the evidence that is available (...) on which that inference may be based is the verbal
and nonverbal communications that [is presented] through their interaction” (p. 69). This shows how they infer the
mental model of the individuals based on the verbal and non-verbal communications.
4.1.2. Social-cultural perspectives
As for the conceptualization of mind, the studies related to the socio-cultural perspective refer to contributions in
the activity, focusing on the actions that the group participants undertake during the group work (see Table 2). All ﬁve
studies related to the socio-cultural perspective were concerned with the question how the group participants acted
on, and thereby deﬁned the speciﬁc domain or object of activity. In other words, this domain is what motivates the
people to work together, and through working together they deﬁne concretely this particular domain. The process
of deﬁning the domain or object of the work can be regarded as a continuous process of creating, what in cognitive
perspectives would be called “task models”. In these studies, deﬁning the object of activity, or creating a task model,
is considered to be important for the purpose of understanding a certain problem or question, coordinating actions,
and ultimately achieving the goal of the activity. For example, Granados (2000) studied the group understanding of the
design space or conceptual structure that is build by a group of students, by analyzing the commands in performing the
task and the kinds of marks (clarifying statements and questions) that are made within the group. De Haan (2001) was
concerned not only with how pairs deﬁned the object of activity (the task model), but also with the so-called “team
interaction model” that the pairs were using, by looking at the way teacher-pupil and parent-child pairs divided roles
and responsibilities in solving a particular task. In these ﬁve studies, “mind” is closely related to how one participates
in or contributes to the immediate joint activity (Matusov, 1996), in this case the speciﬁc task at hand. Additionally,
the studies were concerned with cultural dimensions of cognition. Some studies (Auer-Rizzi & Berry, 2000; De Haan,
2001; Hall et al., 2002) addressed how participants coming from similar national cultures, disciplines or professions,
use also similar ways of talking and express their own way of understanding the situation at hand. But this cultural
dimension of cognition is also salient in how these studies do look at joint activity itself, since they focus on how
the speciﬁc ways of talking and understanding of the diverse participants contribute to the development of a group
culture.
In line with conceptualizing ‘cognition’ as situated in the activity of the group, the ﬁve studies focus their anal-
ysis on group discourse and activity (see Table 2). Four studies (Auer-Rizzi & Berry, 2000; De Haan, 2001; Hall et
al., 2002; Granados, 2000) focused not only on the content of what is being discussed in groups (about the object),
but also on the way the group interacts. For example, De Haan conducted ﬁrst a qualitative analysis of the organi-
zational structure of the interactions and of the role divisions that were set up, using a checklist of open questions.
Secondly, she studied the speciﬁc pattern of participation structures and control strategies by a task analysis of sub-
tasks scoring video’s of the activity on: who is taking the initiative, to whom is it directed, who performs, and what
is the involvement of the non-performing partner. These four studies all argued that the framing of expressions also
indicates how one understands the task or object. Only Fiol (1994) did not directly analyze the group discourse,
but followed the two year collaboration process of a new-venture team by analyzing the written reports made by
the team. In several studies coding techniques were used with codes based on either theory (Fiol, 1994) or prelim-
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were not focused on determining the individual cognitions of each group member. Rather, they focused on group
cognition, as implied by the whole of contributions that the group participants made during the interactions and
actions.
4.1.3. Boundary crossing
We found three studies (Derry et al., 1998; Banks & Millward, 2000; Yoo & Kanawattanachai, 2001) that we
consider to be boundary crossing literature, because they were able to pursue a mixed discourse of both cogni-
tive as well as socio-cultural perspectives on mind throughout the whole study (see Table 2). These three studies
focus both on a stable cognitive map (or memory structure representing information and form), and on dynamic,
situated cognitions representing coordination of information and actions. Derry et al. distinguished the individual
long-term memories and the thoughts shared by the individuals during the group work. Similarly, Banks and Millward
(2000) made a distinction between on the one hand a mental model form, representing a map of elements and their
relations and on the other hand mental model states, representing the dynamic conﬁguration of the aspects of the
model that can be changed when running the model. Yoo and Kanawattanachai (2001) distinguished transactive
memory, referring to information that is encoded, stored, and retrieved from the memory of the individual mem-
bers and the individual minds at work during group activity. These three studies were all concerned with the ideas
and information in the teams relevant for conducting the task, or task models, and how these were created in the
teams.
The three studies used different methodologies (see Table 2). Derry et al. (1998) used discourse analysis of the
interactions, to determine if the list of ideas resulting from the meeting represented cognitions that have been more or
less processed by group discussions. Banks and Millward (2000) coded all the communication used and the actions
taken with respect to mental model forms and mental model states. For example, one of the categories used is “offers”;
these kinds of communications provide information about the model form. Yoo and Kanawattanachai (2001) used
self-assessment, asking the group participants to ﬁll in a questionnaire with items referring to the amount of transactive
memory and of collective mind. This questionnaire asked for the perception of behavioral attributes of the team. Based
on these, inference is made regarding the cognitive constructs of transactive memory and collective mind.
The fourth study of Rutkowski and Smits (2001) that was initially classiﬁed as boundary crossing, seemingly
connected to both perspectives, and mixed the two socio-genetic views in discussing group cognition. However, close
examinationofthestudyrevealedthatitdidnotenlightentheissueofboundarycrossing.RutkowskiandSmitsclaimto
look at two schools of thought, constructivist and constructionist schools, similar to what we have termed respectively
the cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives. But, because of the separate “treatment” of the two theoretical schools,
we do not regard this study as a boundary crossing study, even though they explicitly mention and discuss the two
schools of thought related to the concept of shared meaning.
4.2. ‘Group’ cognition
We have described how the studies considered cognition, that is, how they deﬁned and analyzed it. We will now turn
to the conceptualizations of cognition at the group-level in these three groups of studies (studies reﬂecting cognitive
perspectives, socio-cultural perspectives and studies that reﬂect both). We ﬁrst elaborate on the diverse interpretations
of the meaning of cognition at group-level in the studies. Second, we describe how the groups of studies measured
cognition at group-level. Therefore, according to Mohammed, Klimoski, and Rentsch (2000), we distinguish between
two ways for measuring group-level cognitive structures. Individual measures can be aggregated to create higher level
measures (aggregated measurement), or the collectivity can speak for itself (global measurement) (Axelrod, 1976;
Schneider & Angelmar, 1993). Third, we describe how the groups of studies perceived the role of group cognition in
relation to group processes and outcomes.
4.2.1. Cognitive perspectives
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001b) provide an overview of four interpretations that are outlined in the lit-
erature pertaining to the cognitive perspective (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Mohammed &
Dumville, 2001; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). The ﬁrst refers to “overlap” of the individual cognitions: team
members have a part of their knowledge base that is communal. In the second, the authors interpret group
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group cognition is considered as ‘complementary’: knowledge or team-members does not need to be identi-
cal, but leads to the same expectations for the task at hand. In the fourth, group cognition is conceptualized
in terms of ‘distributed’: the knowledge necessary for the task is dispersed among the different members of the
group.
As indicated in Table 2, all studies from cognitive perspectives conceptualize group cognition as a similarity or
overlap between individual mental structures. They are interested in the communality of the cognitions between team
members. Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001a) refer to this group of studies as literature on shared cognition and deﬁne
themasfollows:“Theyallencompassthenotionthatteammembersholdsomeknowledgethatissimilaroroverlapping”
(p.87).Groupcognitionisconceptualizedasagroup-levelconstruct,butthereforetheyrelyheavilyontheindividualas
entity. To share becomes nothing more than a cross-section of those individual entities. And ‘what’ they share reﬂects
organized knowledge; individuals store concepts and relations between these concepts. Group cognition is deﬁned in
terms of similarity in these concepts and relations. What underlies this conceptualization is that cognition is housed
in the mind, as an individual possession. This is also reﬂected in the use of concepts that are derived from cognitive
psychology conceptualizing individual cognition.
Moststudiesusethephrase‘similarity’intheirdeﬁnitionofgroupcognition.Forexample,MohammedandRingseis
(2001) deﬁne the idea of group cognition as similarity among group members regarding how key matters are con-
ceptualized. Others rely on other terms like convergence or overlap; for example Mathieu et al. (2000) deﬁne shared
mental models as the convergence of individual mental models. Nevertheless, the methodology in all studies shows a
focus on similarity, with the underlying hypothesis that the more similarity in the identiﬁed knowledge structures of
the individuals, the better the team functions. Also Mathieu et al. compute a correlation between matrices of individual
ratings and relate this to better team processes and performance.
Following this line, almost all studies rely on aggregated data to represent this group-level construct (see Table 2).
This aggregation is measured by calculating either the variance or the similarity of individual measures (comparing
individual questionnaire answers or individuals’ cognitive maps). For example, some calculated the average of pair
wise comparisons between members (Peterson et al., 2000; Edelson, 2000). Carley (1997) relied on the individual
idiosyncratic cognitive maps to determine the team mental model. Hereby, a thesaurus is used to decide if the content
of individual mental models is similar or not. Only the study of O’Neill et al. (1999) does not make use of data
aggregation. They use, what Mohammed et al. (2000) call, a global measurement technique; the researcher does not
integrate the cognitive structures, but instead the group cognition is elicited from a key informant, observing group
interaction or examining group products. O’Neill et al. used representations of the group members, video records
of participants, and insights gained from the author’s involvement as a participant-observer and from interviews and
conversations.
Although all studies show a similar conceptualization of group cognition in terms of what is meant by “shared”,
they use different hypotheses about the role of group cognition in relation to group processes and outcomes (see
Table 2). First, one can look at group cognition as input for teams to start working (input), as mediating for
team performance (process), or as result in itself (output). Most of the studies study the role of group cognition
as a result of team processes. The studies of Langan-Fox et al. (2001), Levesque et al. (2001) and O’Neill et al.
(1999) are focused on the development of group cognition as a result in itself (output). Langan-Fox et al. (2001)
and Levesque et al. argue that the development of group cognition is important because it supports a group to
work, as it enables individuals to adapt their behavior to the task and other team members. A range of other stud-
ies also picture group cognition as a result of group processes, but in addition study whether group cognition is
related to (a) the successfulness of the group (Carley, 1997; Edelson, 2000; Peterson et al., 2000); (b) the per-
ception of implementation success (Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001), or (c) the performance of the ﬁrm (Ensley &
Pearce, 2001)( process). For example, Ensley and Pearce study, among several other relations, whether the extent to
which mental models on strategy are shared between teams, is related to the success of the ﬁrm in terms of sales
growth.
In contrast to these studies, three studies (Marks et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 2000; Stout et al., 1999) examined the
inﬂuence of group cognition on subsequent group processes (input). Hereby they depicted the role of group cognition
as an input variable. Stout et al. and Mathieu et al. delivered training to their participants, by way of establishing group
cognition as a starting condition for the real teamwork. Marks et al. did not use a training period in their design, but
allowed a planning period in a kind of pre-performance period. In these three studies, group cognition is treated as an
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4.2.2. Socio-cultural perspectives
Asindicatedbefore,thestudiesinthesocio-culturalperspectivesdeﬁnedcognitionintermsofcontributionstojoint
activity. Furthermore, these studies consider group cognition as constituted by the way in which those contributions
have a central orientation towards deﬁning the object of activity. If a group shows a particular pattern in deﬁning the
task at hand, then that pattern is indicative for the group cognition. The studies of the cognitive perspectives showed
diverse interpretations of group cognition. Unlike the cognitive perspectives, the socio-cultural perspectives do not
interpret cognition at the group-level in terms of similarity, overlap, complementarity, or distribution. All these four
interpretationsimplysomesortofcomparisonbetweenseparateindividualminds.Thesocio-culturalperspectiverather
perceives group cognition as something constituted by the group as an entity in itself. As such, cognition resides in
the active mind, as a phenomenon situated in the group interaction. The concept group cognition is then deﬁned as
a process of coordination of participants’ contributions in joint activity (Matusov, 1996). Despite different contexts,
the studies all deﬁne group cognition as a process phenomenon that is situated in group collaboration and that allows
for coordinated action (see Table 2). Similar to this focus on coordinated action is the concept of collective mind as
described by Weick and Roberts (1993). They described and illustrated collective mind in organizations as a pattern
of heedful interrelations of actions in a social system. In such a pattern, actions are conscientiously, critically and
carefully (i.e., heedful) constructed. Moreover, when actions are constructed, the acting subject envisages the social
system of joint actions, and subordinates his or her actions to this system (interrelate). Additionally, Matusov notes
how a “participatory notion of intersubjectivity” (cfr. socio-cultural perspective on group cognition) moves beyond
individual intentionality, since the direction of the activity is not foreseen by any of the participants. In these studies,
“shared” refers to the degree of coordination that is seen in this social action. When contributions in the group have
a central orientation, it is possible to coordinate the actions, even though the participants may have diverse views
or even disagreements. For example, Granados (2000) talks about how the group, working on a design problem,
develops a design space, which is an “open and negotiated conceptual structure that contains the ongoing collective
speciﬁcations relevant to the design activity” (p. 505). Moreover, using similar modes of thinking is argued to lead to
reproductive processes, with the danger of group think narrowness, while disruptions resulting from different views
of participants and socio-cultural subgroups are perceived as offering potential for productive, creative processes and
group development (Homan, 2001; Matusov, 1996).
The ﬁve studies measure group cognition by looking what patterns are revealed in their analysis of the group
interactionandwork(seeTable2).Therebytheyused“globalmeasurement”.Thepatternswithinthegroup’sinteraction
and work show how the participants coordinate their actions and arrive at a decision or solution to the problem. So
far as these studies do look at individual cognitions and compare them, these studies always focus on cognition as
it appears during social interaction. However, the focus is not on a set of individual minds, but on the mind that is
established by the whole group or by socio-cultural subgroups, as directly implied by the patterns in the interaction.
For example, Hall et al. (2002) analyze how disciplinary groups put their difference in understanding and in using
objects into coordinated action and when these differences lead to conﬂict.
Similar to the studies showing cognitive perspectives, these ﬁve studies also have different understandings of the
role of group cognition in relation to group processes and outcomes (see Table 2). However, whereas the studies in
the cognitive perspectives differed in conceptualizing group cognition as either input, process of output variable, the
model of input-process-output variables does not apply to these ﬁve studies. The ﬁve studies are concerned with group




(Matusov, 1996). According to Matusov (1996), group cognition can be perceived as a common ground (a shared
background) between the group members that is activated in the group collaboration, as common engagement (shared
activity), or as updated common ground (a shared experience) that is built during the collaboration. Considering these,
the ﬁve studies also differed in their perceptions of the role of group cognition. Auer-Rizzi and Berry (2000) group
participants that shared a business or a cultural background and looked how these backgrounds offered a common
ground or frame of reference for those participants to collaborate more easily. Three studies (De Haan, 2001; Fiol,
1994;Granados,2000)focusedonthecreationofgroupcognitionasacommonengagementamongtheparticipantswho
are directly involved in the joint activity, or, as Stone (1993, as cited in De Haan, 2001) wrote: “a continuous evolving
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by referring to group cognition in all three sequential moments, that is, to group cognition as common ground, as
common engagement, and as updated common ground. They argue that group participants from different disciplines
understand and use objects in strikingly different ways (sharing a disciplinary background provides common ground).
The differences between participants can either go unnoticed or be put into coordinated use (common engagement)
without explicit, group cognition. By studying a multi-disciplinary group working on a design problem, Hall et al.
found that differences become remarkable either when a design proposal runs counter to deeply held disciplinary
objectives or threatens to destabilize a wider network of tools and concepts (or representational infrastructure) used
in that particular discipline. In such cases differences may disrupt or change the representational infrastructures that a




the three boundary crossing studies the authors interpret the concept of shared in terms of “distributed”: the knowledge
necessaryforthetaskisdispersedamongthedifferentmembersofthegroup(seeTable2).Derryetal.(1998)notedthat
a group distributed working memory would represent those thoughts from distributed long-term memory that becomes
active within any individual’s attention during the group discussion. Connecting this to the notion of group cognition,
they write: “Obviously, only ideas that are shared (discussed) by one individual (and attended to by others) have the
potential to modify a group’s collective long-term memory” (p. 30). Similar to this, Banks and Millward (2000) deﬁne
the central group cognition concept, shared mental model, as “a distributed system which runs a model collectively
through the propagation of representational states across representational media”. By that deﬁnition they point on the
one hand to the stable form of mental models. As an example they refer to a mental model of a bath that will have
a certain size and therefore maximum volume. These aspects refer to model form, and will not change. On the other
hand they point to the dynamic conﬁguration of the aspects of the model that can be changed when running the model.
In the example this can be seen as the plug being in or not or as the amount of water actually in the bath at any point
in time. These aspects refer to states, and are dynamic and depending on the speciﬁc situation.
The third boundary crossing study (Yoo & Kanawattanachai, 2001) uses the concepts of transactive memory and
collective mind to combine cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives on group cognition. With transactive memory,
following Wegner, Erber, and Raymond (1991), they imply a “shared system for encoding, storing, and retrieving
information”. With collective mind they, following Weick and Roberts (1993), refer to a social cognitive system in
which individuals heedfully interrelate their actions. Whereas transactive memory reﬂects the cognitive perspectives
on group cognition, the concept collective mind reﬂects the socio-cultural perspectives on group cognition. The former
refers to cognition within the minds of the group members, the latter points to cognition within group interaction.
They draw upon these two concepts to examine how teams coordinate and interrelate their knowledge and actions in
order to perform their tasks. In short, all three studies integrated elements of the cognitive perspectives (concepts like
informationprocessing,long-termmemory,mentalmodelform,transactivememory)andelementsofthesocio-cultural
perspective (concepts such as situated cognition, distributed working memory, mental model state, collective mind)
into an integrated approach centralized around the term distributed cognition. We summarize the integrated elements
in these three studies in Table 3 below.
To measure group cognition, two of the studies used global measurement (see Table 2). They looked at the charac-
teristics of the group as an entity (Banks & Millward, 2000; Derry et al., 1998), through analysis of the group discourse
and activity. The third study (Yoo & Kanawattanachai, 2001) used questionnaires to ask each group member about
Table 3
Elements of the socio-genetic perspectives that are integrated in the boundary crossing studies




Combined in a notion of
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the extent of group cognition in the group, with statements such as “Our team members had a global perspective that
includes each other’s decisions and the relationships among them.” Since these perception measures formed the only
basis for their analysis of the group cognition of the group, they recommended in their discussion that in future studies
the contents of the communication interactions should also be examined.
With respect to the role of group cognition in relation to group processes and outcomes, the input-process-output
model best represents the way the three studies dealt with group cognition (see Table 2). All three studies theoretically
introduced group cognition partly as input for groups to work and partly as a process variable, developing during group
working. Yoo and Kanawattanachai (2001) hypothesized that group cognition in terms of transactive memory of the
group (input variable) had an inﬂuence on the group cognition in terms of the interrelation of actions during the group
work (process variable). This latter was hypothesized as mediating the team performance. Derry et al. (1998) also
noted group cognition of the group as input variable for the group to work in terms of overlap of prior knowledge, but
their analysis focused only on the group cognition as a process variable (ideas shared during the interaction) which
may inﬂuence the nature of the ﬁnal group products. Banks and Millward (2000) studied group cognition as input in
terms of the inﬂuence of shared and diverse information known to the team members, and group cognition as process
variable in terms of the information that was shared during the group interaction.
5. Comparing different conceptualizations of group cognition
The purpose of this review is to explicate the various ways in which group cognition is conceptualized in the
empirical literature in educational and psychological sciences. In doing so, this review wants to offer researchers a
ground for conceptual clarity. It has been unclear how the empirical studies relate to each other as they use many
different concepts as well as different, but often implicit, understandings of group cognition. We have reviewed the
different conceptualizations and framed them in terms of socio-genetic views. This showed how respectively cognitive
andsocio-culturalperspectivesongroupcognitionarediscernableinthestudies(seeTable4).Thediversityinconcepts,
conceptualizationsandmethodsturnedouttobescatteredaroundtheresearchstrands.Bylookingfora‘deeper’ground,
that is by searching for theoretical perspectives, we have indicated a fundamental difference in point of view on group
cognition, irrespective of the research strand or goal of the particular research. The following paragraphs discuss the
differences, which appears to be similarities and complementarity of these different perspectives. Founded on this, it
is questioned how future research can relate to these perspectives.




and accordingly measured group cognition as a process of coordination of actions, or as a dynamic unity of individual
contributions in the joint activity (Matusov, 1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Cognition is then localized within the
interrelatedactions.Itisalsothisactivitywhichbecomesthefocusoftheanalysis.Consideringtheseﬁndings,itshows
that these perspectives offer divergent conceptualizations of group cognition.
Along with these different conceptualizations, the studies connected to both perspectives use different key terms
and even different discourses. The studies in the cognitive perspectives use academic terms such as information,
knowledge, mental models, knowledge structures, building models, while the studies in the socio-cultural perspectives
useacademictermssuchasparticipation,activity,interaction,processesandcoordination.Furthermore,inthecognitive
perspectives input-process-output models are used in studying processes, whereas in the studies with socio-cultural
perspectives group cognition is considered to be a process-like and situated phenomenon, which continuously needs
to be re-established.
Table 4
Cognitive versus socio-cultural perspectives on group cognition
Cognitive perspectives on group cognition Socio-cultural perspectives on group cognition
Viewed as a state (having in common) Viewed as a process (continuously negotiated)
Focus on individual subjectivities Focus on joint activity
Focus on uniﬁcation of participants’ subjectivities Focus on coordination of contributions
Focus on consensus Focus on diversity and dynamic unityS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 53
If we want to be able to make use of and build on these various studies and their differences, it becomes interesting
and relevant to wonder how they could contribute to co-create a useful and coherent theory on group cognition. To
reﬂectonthis,weneedtoposethequestiontowhatextentandinwhatwaysarethedifferencesintheconceptualizations
between the theoretical perspectives complementary? Moreover, we need to question whether there are possibilities
for synthesis between the perspectives. By conceptualizing group cognition as they do, what is it precisely that each
of the perspectives leaves behind? As Greeno (1998) described, cognitive perspectives assume the decomposability of
complex systems into a set of subsystems. Because of this assumption, the cognitive strategy is able to learn about the
properties of each of these subsystems (an individuals’ subjectivity) separately from the other subsystems, in order
to build an understanding of the whole complex system. In relation to group cognition this means that one focuses
on individuals’ subjectivity (in terms of ones knowledge, mental model, or ones perspective), and then looks at the
similarity between the individual’s subjectivities. Socio-cultural perspectives assume systems of activity as “intact
multiperson, human-technology systems” (Greeno, 1998). Hence, the socio-cultural tradition is able to learn about the
intrinsic personality that complex systems (like groups or teams) endow, independent from those of its subsystems
(individual members).
The drawback of each of these perspectives on group cognition seems to be exactly what is essentially highlighted
by the other perspective. The cognitive tradition looses sight of the intrinsic nature of the complex system as a whole,
and can only learn about it through the aggregation of the properties of subsystems. The shortcoming of this is that, in
the end, groups are understood as some sort of sum of its members. In contrast, the socio-cultural tradition looses sight
of the intrinsic nature of the subsystems, and learns about them only through the perspective of the system of which
they are part. The drawback here is that subsystems (e.g., individuals, actions) are understood to be a function of their
relations with other subsystems. Individuals are always participants of multiple social contexts. Anderson, Reder, and
Simon (1997) noted that in such understandings, individuals tend to get ‘absorbed’ in the collectives of which they are
part.
The above suggests the complementary makeup of both perspectives. In this review, we identiﬁed three studies
that we perceived as boundary crossing. Let us return to these, and see what precisely these studies integrate and
what we can learn from them regarding the complementary make-up of the perspectives. As we concluded, these
three studies distinguish within their conceptualization of group cognition between a stable cognitive map or memory
structure representing information and form, and dynamic, situated cognition representing coordination of information
and actions. They focused on the interaction between these using the term distributed cognition in referring to this
process of interaction. What they were able to do was to decompose subsystems within the whole complex system of
a team and reveal their inherent properties, while simultaneously revealing the intrinsic nature of the complex system
itself, separately from the subsystems. On the one hand, they identiﬁed individual subjectivities in terms of stable
cognitive maps, and on the other hand they identiﬁed group processes in terms of the individual mental states situated
in the interaction. So in a very precise and clear way they integrated in their focus the intrinsic nature of decomposable
subsystems and the intrinsic nature of the whole system.
What follows is the question whether these studies, with integrating elements of both the cognitive and socio-
cultural perspectives, pursued a fair account of each of these two perspectives. Looking at their integration from the
perspective of the cognitive perspectives, one would say that they indeed managed to create a complete picture of
cognition, extending individual cognition as structures within the individual mind to include situated processes in
which cognition becomes mental states or the processing of information.
Considering the practice of integration in these studies from the perspective of socio-cultural thinking, one doubts
if it accounts for the socio-cultural tradition in the end. Of course, by focusing on distributed cognition, the studies
considered not only the individual cognition but also the cognition that is situated in the activity processes. But, what is
questionableintermsofsocio-culturalthinkingistreatingcognitionitselfasdecomposable.Distributedcognitionis,at
least in the three studies discussed here, treated as dividing up the cognitive processes taking place within the heads of
individuals (individual cognition in terms of mental models, memory) and the processes taking place in the interaction
(situatedcognition).Thesituatedcognitioninfactonlyreferstotheinformationthatisconversationallysharedbetween
these individuals. And with the term distributed cognition the studies signify that not all information relevant for a
speciﬁc situation needs to be conversationally shared between all individuals, in order to build up the informational
structure that is needed to coordinate the collaborative work well. Although choosing the term distributed cognition
instead of situated cognition, the emphasis in these studies remains on exactly these informational structures, whereby
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pinpoint the properties (e.g., contents of information) of the structures at speciﬁc times. Socio-cultural perspectives
instead, perceive cognition (whether using the term situated or distributed) as the socially developed routine practices
themselves, and rather focus on the dynamic transformation within these practices. Individual cognition is deﬁned by
its relations to social practices, as is illustrated by the following quote of Greeno (1998):
Regularities of an individual’s activities, in a trajectory that spans participation at different times in a community
and participation in different communities, are characterized as the individual’s identity (Wenger, 1998), which
is coconstituted by the individual’s relation of those communities to the individual (Mead, 1934,p .6 ) .
In terms of socio-cultural perspectives, individual cognition is considered not as a property of structures (e.g.,
autonomous agents have knowledge), but rather as a continuous process of relation (e.g., participants knowing during
practice). Despite the complementary nature of the two perspectives, it seems the boundary crossing literature about
group cognition followed the cognitive perception of cognition and did not manage to fully account for the basic
assumptions of socio-cultural perspectives.
6. Towards one theoretical perspective on group cognition?
What are the directions that future research can take? Is it advisable to strive for a coherent theory on group
cognition, or is it better to have the two perspectives, as the differences are insurmountable? These matters raise the
more fundamental question if it is at all possible for the two perspectives to reconcile or synthesize? Scrutinizing some
of the most recent discussions and efforts of transcending the cognitive and socio-cultural perspectives (Anderson,




object and means of researching it (Glick, 2004), and its own questions and framing of assumptions (Greeno, 1997).
Packer and Goicoechea (2000) even go so far as to state that the cognitive perspectives and socio-cultural perspectives
not only differ in their epistemological assumptions (when is knowledge valid, what counts as truth), but also in their
ontological assumptions (what is, what exists, and what it means for something to be). They stated that cognitive
perspectives imply a dualist ontological approach, in which construction is viewed only as a cognitive activity in which
subjectivity structures and shapes data that comes from a distinct and separate objective world. As opposed to that,
socio-cultural perspectives bring forward a non-dualistic ontological approach, in which subjectivities and the objects
themselves are constructed and mutually deﬁne each other. We found substantial differences in conceptualizations
between the studies within the cognitive perspectives and the studies within the socio-cultural perspectives. And
indeed, reconsidering the socio-genetic framework in which the studies could be placed, the two perspectives reﬂect
assumptions that seem ontologically different. Cognitive perspectives seem to assume that things (e.g., individuals
or mental models) can exist independently, although it can change by its relations. Socio-cultural perspectives seem
to assume an ontology in which things only exist in relation to other things (individuals are participants; minds are
situated in social action). Because of these differences, Glick emphasizes that the only level at which a relationship
between these perspectives can be sought is at the level of contributing to an arsenal of explanatory devices, perceiving
theories and perspectives as tools.
A second answer is that it is possible for the two perspectives to start a true dialogical engagement. In fact, such
a dialogical engagement was started between Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996, 1997) representing the cognitive
perspectives and Greeno (1997) representing the socio-cultural perspectives. After this exchange, which had more the
undertone of a debate, these authors arrived at conclusion to their discussion (Anderson, Greeno, Reder, & Simon,
2000). Besides stating some very obvious educational matters on which the perspectives agreed, they noted that the
different perspectives do propose alternative explanations for phenomena, but are each in an incomplete state, showing
theneedforfurtherreconciliation.Inreactiontothisdiscussion,CobbandBowers(1999)wrotetobeskepticaboutthe
prospect of a dialogical engagement, saying: “In our view, a continuing intellectual exchange of the type envisioned by
Greeno is virtually impossible unless proponents of each perspective come to understand the basic tenets of the other
viewpoint” (p. 6). They emphasize that the discussion between Greeno (1998) and Anderson et al. (2000) proved that
basic assumptions of the one perspective leads to misinterpreting the arguments of the other perspective. According to
them, a dialogue can only be started through the development of a viable basis for communication. Alternative to anS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 55
explicit scientiﬁc dialogue like the one between Greeno and Anderson et al. would be an attempt of each to resolve its
owndrawbacksbyreckoningthehighlightsandexplanationsoftheotherperspective.ThisisalsoproposedbyGreeno,
who discusses two possible routes:
o To take the theory of individual cognition (here cognitive perspectives) as its basis and build toward a broader theory
by incrementally developing analyses of additional components of situations that are considered as contexts for
cognitive processes;
o To take the theory of social and ecological interactions (here socio-cultural perspectives) as its basis and build
toward a more comprehensive theory by developing increasingly detailed analyses of structures of information that
are produced by the interactions people have with each other and with the material and representational resources
in their environments.
The analysis of the studies that we considered as boundary crossing literature showed that these studies are exactly
a reﬂection of the ﬁrst route, in which they depart from cognitive perspectives and attempt to extend it by including
situated accounts of cognition. Before, we noted that Thompson (1998) described this route more generally in terms
of a current movement of the cognitive perspectives. It seems that the socio-cultural tradition would construct the
integration seen in the three boundary crossing studies in a different way. In our review, we have not found empirical
studies reﬂecting the second route. Suggestions for the second route were made by Greeno (1998), Valsiner and Van
der Veer (2000), and Packer and Goicoechea (2000). For the socio-cultural tradition, these suggestions imply deﬁning
individualcognitionasstructuresofsocio-culturalrelations(whichisatranslationoftheinformationalelementswithin
the studies in the cognitive tradition). As Packer and Goicoechea illustrate, an integration of the second route, means
that the ontological assumptions implied by the cognitive perspectives are included, but only secondary; the dualism
of subject and object becomes a reality through the non-dualistic processes of their coming into being. Valsiner and
Van der Veer (2000) and Hermans and Kempen (1993) implement this second route by considering the individual as a
dialogical system by itself. Cognition is then deﬁned as an individual property, but the individual itself is an inherently
social entity, constituted through its social relations with others.
A third answer to the question about the reconciliation between the perspectives is that it would be possible to
synthesize them into one coherent theory. Although the boundary crossing literature can be considered as attempts of
synthesizing the perspectives, we also concluded that they did not succeed in a complete synthesis because of their
neglectofsomebasicassumptionsofthesocio-culturalperspectives.Weseeasimilarproblemwiththeoreticalattempts
to transcend differences between the cognitive and the socio-cultural perspectives. For example, recently, Saxe and
Simonde (2004) and Gauvain (2004) claimed to work towards an integrated view of human development. Central
to their integration is the assumption that cognition should be understood in a framework embedding cognition in a
social-historical context. The basic assumptions from which they depart indicate that, instead of a full synthesis, their
integration reﬂects more the second route that Greeno (1998) described. They depart from a socio-cultural perspective
and include precise accounts of individual cognition.
Reﬂecting on these three answers, it seems that a complete integration of the two perspectives is not possible; each
perspectiveinitscurrentstatushasinasenseitsownobjectandafullintegrationatthispointwouldmeanloosingsight
of some of the basic assumptions of one of the perspectives. Following Greeno’s suggestion, we think that the most
meaningful ﬁrst step to bring together the values of both the cognitive perspectives and the socio-cultural perspectives
is for each perspective to extend itself to include some of the explanations offered by the other perspective.
This ﬁrst step of cross-fertilization, however, requires researchers ﬁrst to question carefully their basic assumptions
(e.g., using Table 4) in conceptualizing group cognition, and relate themselves to more fundamental theoretical per-
spectives (e.g., using Table 1). Only then, it is possible to fully grasp the speciﬁc conceptualization of group cognition
that is used and to build forward on the ﬁndings of these studies. Besides, we suggest researchers to choose termi-
nology and methodologies accordingly (e.g., using analysis columns in Table 2). For as each researcher clariﬁes their
premises,futureattemptsforcross-fertilizationarefacilitated.Thisreviewsuppliesthetoolsforthiseffortbyofferinga
dialectic re-conceptualization of the existing diverse terminology, and the identiﬁcation of the conﬂicting premises and
methodologies. By this, it lays the ground for conceptual clarity that enables to build on each other’s work. Concerning
future research aiming at incorporating aspects of both perspectives on group cognition, the approach of the studies
identiﬁed in this review as boundary crossing can be regarded as valuable and promising, since they try to include
aspects from a different perspective on group cognition. We regard the two possible routes of integrations crucial for56 S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63
future studies to work towards more coherent theories of the concept of group cognition. By either extending cognitive
conceptualizations of group cognition to include social accounts of cognition or by extending socio-cultural conceptu-
alizations of group cognition to include more precise accounts of individual cognition, we believe the studies on group
cognition would be more complete. They would both, in their own ways provide answer to the critical socio-genetic
question posed by Valsiner and Van der Veer (2000): “How to construe persons as being social without abandoning
their obvious personal autonomy, separateness from any social unit (group, crowd, community), while being members
of such units?” (p. 6).
Groups of people are increasingly acknowledged as the source of knowledge construction (Akkerman, Admiraal,
Simons, & Niessen, 2006). Team learning has become a cornerstone of organizational life and it is increasingly being
capitalized on in educational settings (Van den Bossche, Gijselaers, Segers & Kirschner, 2006). In this context, the
construct of group cognition is proposed as a central issue in research on team learning (Roschelle, 1992; Webb &
Palincsar, 1996). The development of group cognition is a process of negotiating and interrelating diverse views of
group members. This process enables group members to learn from others’ preferences and viewpoints by facing
different viewpoints and by accepting the existence of them as legitimate (Engestr¨ om et al., 1995). This implies that in
ordertobetterunderstandhowteamlearningworksandunderwhichconditionsitiseffective,researchontheprocesses
in and through which group cognition is actually developing is promising.
Aclearconceptualizationofgroupcognitionisanecessaryconditionfordesigningempiricalstudiesongrouplearn-
ing. Moreover, in order to deepen our understanding of the process of team learning in educational and organisational
settings, building on previous research is a conditio sine qua non. This asks for conceptual clarity of the core concepts
and the methodology used. The conceptual framework offered in this review can be used as a tool for educational
researchers to deﬁne the conceptual framework of their study and to argue on the methodological choices made.
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Appendix A
Description of each study
Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition
1 Yoo and Kanawattanachai
(2001). Developments of
transactive memory systems





Interrelation between: 1. Aggregation of intra group
responses on four 5-point
Likert scales questions about
acting, understanding and
interrelating in the team
1. collective mind=social
cognitive system in which
individuals heedfully interrelate
their actions (Weick & Roberts,
1993)
2. Aggregation of intra group
responses on three 5-point
Likert scales questions about
who knows what
2. transactive memory=shared
system for encoding, storing, and
retrieving information (Wegner et
al., 1991)
2 Derry et al. (1998). Individual
and distributed cognitions in
interdisciplinary teamwork: a








Compatible understandings of the
task and team that become
sufﬁciently aligned
The degree to which resulting
ideas represent cognitions
that have been more or less
processed by group
discussionsS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 57
Appendix A (Continued)
Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition
3 Mohammed and Ringseis
(2001). Cognitive diversity
and consensus in group








Similarity among group members
regarding how key matters are
conceptualized
The degree of variation of
group participants’ responses
on ﬁve-item 7-point Likert
scale questions about how
they interpreted the task
(=negative measure)
4 Levesque et al. (2001).
Cognitive divergence and
shared mental models in
software development project
teams





‘Knowledge structures held by
members of a team that enable
them to form accurate
explanations and expectations for
the task, and in turn to coordinate
their actions and adapt their
behaviour to demands of the task
and other team members’
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993)
Overall intra-team similarity




and team expertise ratings
(ratings of each other’s
expertise)




1. Sometimes explicit same
understandings about proposed
activity and its meaning
The degree to which
coordinated action is reached,
despite different ways in
which people position
themselves and others with







6 Mathieu et al. (2000). The
inﬂuence of shared mental




shared vision, common vision
Convergence of individual mental
models; mental
model=‘mechanism whereby
humans generate descriptions of
system purpose and form,
explanations of system
functioning and observed system
states, and predictions of future
system states’ (Rouse & Morris,
1986);
Correlation between matrices
of individual ratings of the
relations between critical
(team and task based)
attributes
7 Banks and Millward (2000).
Running shared mental
models as a distributed
cognitive process
Shared mental models A distributed system which runs
a model collectively trough the
propagation of representational
states across representational
media; mental model form=the
homographic mapping consisting
of elements and their relations
which represent the thing being
modeled; the mental model
state=the dynamic conﬁguration
of the aspects of the model that
can be changed when running the
mode
Comparison of the








completely, or on complete
modules, or only part of the
modules)58 S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63
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Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition
8 Peterson et al. (2000).
Collective efﬁcacy and
aspects of shared mental
models as predictors of
performance over time in
work groups







Cognitive representations of task
requirements, procedures and




amount of points attributed in
the individual questionnaires;
points attributed to:
1. the extent of contributions




2. the extent of contributions
of oneself to the task
(indicating egotism)
3. the importance of task
components for producing
good results
9 Ensley and Pearce (2001).
Shared cognition in top
management teams:




The extent to which the mental
models about strategy are shared
Coefﬁcient of variation of
individual answers on 33
seven dimension scale items
about business level strategy
10 Rutkowski and Smits (2001).
Constructionist theory to
explain effects of GDSS
Shared meaning; shared
mental models, group vision
1. Constructionist conceptualize
meaning as the expression of a
speciﬁc pattern of coordinated
interactions, internalized in
concepts and reproducible
quasi-individually each time an
object is recognized and referred




(cognitive schemes) [no speciﬁc
deﬁnition is given when
something is shared]
11 Fiol (1994). Consensus,







Convergence around (a speciﬁc
dimension of) meaning
The extent of progressive
convergence across
subgroups in patterns of:
1. certainty of positions
2. perceived judgement of
issues
3. perceived controllability of
issues
4. scope of the arguments; as
seen in the content and
framing of expressions in the
logged group entriesS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 59
Appendix A (Continued)
Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition
12 Hare and O’Neill (2000).
Effectiveness and efﬁciency




Sense of commonality which
gives coherence to diverse
activities
The result of a content
analysis (afﬁnity clustering
technique) of the responses in
individual interviews on 25
questions eliciting in-depth
responses in a.o. the area of
shared vision, mission and
goals
13 Langan-Fox et al. (2001).
Analyzing shared and team
mental models
Shared mental model/team
mental models (as distinct
concepts)
The extent to which a group
(dyad) of individuals possesses a
similar cognitive representation
for some situation or
phenomenon
The average (negatively




14 Carley (1997). Extracting
team mental models through
textual analysis
Team mental models ‘Shared’ or ‘social’ knowledge;
(lossy) intersection of the
individual mental maps
A team cognitive map,
representing the (lossy)
intersection of individual
cognitive maps; an individual
cognitive map consists of
both concepts and the
relationships between them,
as extracted from individual
answers on open-ended
questions
15 Mulder et al. (2002).







beliefs, and mutual assumptions
(Clark & Brennan, 1991)
Means of the individual
ratings on four 6/7 Likert
scale items about the
individual and group
understanding of content, the














knowledge, mutual beliefs and
mutual assumptions) and
grounding (a coordination of
process)
Patterns of marking in
communication by the
participants to deﬁne,
constrain, and maintain their
understanding of the task at
hand (e.g. including
knowledge, setting goals,
setting actions), as coded in
the transcription of video
segments
17 Auer-Rizzi and Berry (2000).
Business vs. Cultural frames




Frame of reference, shared
assumptions; shared culture,
common ground
Finding common ground for
different business and cultural
assumptions during decision
making







in-depth interviews60 S. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63
Appendix A (Continued)
Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition










Overlap between private models
of group participants representing
an understanding of the object of
activity
Overlap between the internal
private model representing
the user’s understanding of
the object of the development
activity and the internal
private model representing
the developer’s
understandings as inferred by




19 Marks et al. (2002). The
impact of cross-training on
team effectiveness
Shared team-interaction
mental models, shared mental
models
Similarity among team members’
team-interaction mental models;
mental models is the content and
organization of inter-role
knowledge held by team
members within a performance
setting; team interaction models
contains procedural knowledge
about members’ roles and task at
particular times
1. (Experiment 1:) average
similarity between team
members’ individual ratings
of the relations among critical
task concepts
2. (Experiment 2:) the
percentage of concepts placed
identically on the concept
maps
20 Stout et al. (1999). Planning,
shared mental models, and
coordinated performance: An
empirical link is established




Common understanding of who
is responsible for what task and
what the information
requirements are




conﬁgural network is based
on 190 judgments of the
relatedness of concepts on 7
point Likert-scale
21 Edelson (2000). The inﬂuence
of supervisor-subordinate




Shared mental models Similarity between mental
models of people; mental
models=working models in the
brains of people to understand the
world and predict its happenings,
by simplifying reality to permit
adequate and rapid prediction of
a system’s behavior
(Calculated negatively:)
1. The mean difference of
answers between the group
members on 59 questions
about the supervisor’s
interaction with the group
2. The mean difference of
answers between the group
members and between the
supervisor on 36 5-point
Likert scale questions about
the supervisor’s interaction
with the groupS. Akkerman et al. / Educational Research Review 2 (2007) 39–63 61
Appendix A (Continued)
Nr Studies Group cognition concepts
used in article [cursive is the
term by which the article is
found]
Deﬁnition: group cognition Analysis of group cognition
22 De Haan (2001).
Intersubjectivity in models of
learning and teaching:
reﬂections from a study of












1. Context creation: the kind of
efforts put into establishing
intersubjectivity; 2. Identity of
interlocutors: the kind of roles or
identities that are assumed or
created; 3. The kind of
communicative structures and





1. if context creation was
based either on assuming
communality versus the need









and means to organize
common understanding either
parallel or sequentially, and
either continuously or
through segmentation of the
activity
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